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Abstract
This paper focuses on comparing public and private individual wealth over the life-cycle,
when individuals face an uncertain length of life. We also analyze how a fully funded and ac-
tuarially fair Social Security affects the desire to annuitize private wealth. Within this frame-
work, we find that a social security system can contribute to reaching a higher national wealth,
even when the economy is composed of selfish individuals. Thus, by means of some simula-
tions we obtain the result that a payroll tax of 6 percent increases individual wealth up to 17
percent. This increment, however, is obtained under the assumption that insurance companies
offer fair annuities. On the contrary, under an unfair private annuity market, individual wealth
can decrease around 10 percent for the same payroll tax.
Key words: Actuarially Fair Funded Social Security, Crowding Out Effect, Public and Private Wealth Pro-
files
JEL classification: D01, D31, D81, D91, G11, H31
∗I am grateful to Felipe Sa´ez, Richard Watt, Ronald Lee, Julian Moral, and Jose´ Luis Zofio for helpful suggestions
and comments. Aid from the Universidad Autonoma de Madrid during these last three years is gratefully acknowledged.
Any errors are my own.
†Corresponding author. Tel:+34 914972955; fax:+34 914978616; e-mail: miguel.romero@uam.es
1 Introduction
It has been well known since Feldstein (1974)1 that Social Security crowds out private saving.
The intensity of this crowding out effect varies according to how Social Security is financed, the
behavior of each individual in the economy, and the return yielded by public and private pensions.
First, we know that the negative impact of a funded social security system on steady-state capi-
tal stock is smaller, or zero, than that yielded by an unfunded system. Thus for example, Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987), ˙Imrohorog˘lu et al. (1999), and Conesa and Krueger (1999) estimate under
an unfunded Social Security that steady-state capital stock is reduced between 11 and 25 percent.
On the contrary, under a funded Social Security and lifetime uncertainty, Eckstein et al. (1985),
Abel (1985), and Hubbard (1987) demonstrate that the crowding out only occurs when selfish
individuals have neither access to the annuity market, nor actuarially fair annuities.
Second, individual feelings can influence the intensity of the crowding out effect as well.
In particular, the more altruistic an agent is, the greater her saving and, therefore, her wealth
is. Hence, Fuster (1999) finds that an unfunded social security system with two-sided altruistic
agents crowds out only 8 percent of the capital stock for a 44 percent replacement rate. Note that
this value is much lower than those estimated for selfish individuals by Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987), among others. Nevertheless, there does not exist a consensus among economists regarding
the importance of altruistic feelings on individual’s behavior. Thus, we shall assume that our
individual is selfish hereinafter.
Third, it has also been quantified that Social Security does not reduce the stock of capital in
the long-run, so long as public and private pensions yield the same return. Unfortunately, this
result has been obtained assuming that the decision of purchasing annuities is exogenous. As
a consequence, we cannot derive any relationship between the desire to purchase annuities and
wealth over time.
In this paper, we analyze how the wealth accumulation process is affected when both the So-
cial Security is funded and individuals endogenously purchase annuities. To do so, we develop
an economy that incorporates financial companies, private insurances, and a funded Social Secu-
rity. Consequently, individuals can invest their wealth in safe assets, risky assets, and annuities.
Moreover, in order to make the decision of purchasing annuities endogenous, we have made the
following five assumptions: i) our individual faces an uncertain lifespan, ii) the yield of annuities
1This negative effect was found firstly by Feldstein (1974) in the case of an unfunded Social Security.
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dominates that of bonds, iii) a negative asset position at the time of death is forbidden, iv) the con-
sumer is selfish, and v) she has a bounded rationality (i.e., even though financial institutions do not
allow individuals to die in debt, our agent does not make decisions considering this constraint).
Under the first four assumptions, Yaari (1965) states that the consumer will fully annuitize her
savings. However, Sanchez-Romero (2005) demonstrates, by adding the assumption number v),
that the decision of purchasing annuities depends on the relationship between the present value
of future non-capital earnings and the initial wealth. That is to say, he finds that private annuities
are not purchased when public benefits are high. Therefore, this last finding suggests that the
crowding out effect should be analyzed not only by studying what sort of social security system
the economy has, but also whether individuals are willing to purchase annuities or not.
On the other hand, the implications of these five assumptions are consistent with the fact that
the demand for annuities is small on average. Nonetheless, there are other factors that explain the
lack of annuitization, although they are out of the scope of this paper. For example, bequest mo-
tive, annuity market imperfections such as the irreversibility of annuitization, or even risk sharing
within families. The importance of any of these factors is, besides our assumption number v), that
wealth accumulated at the age of retirement may change. This is in addition to the fact that wealth
inequality, among descendants of people recently deceased, might increase over time.
Finally, it is worth noting that the utility function and the dynamic optimization method used
throughout the paper to calculate the optimal portfolio differ from previous analysis. Thus, instead
of using a CRRA utility function and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman method, as Merton (1971) and
Richard (1975) have done before, we use a mean-variance utility and the Lagrange method, in
order to be consistent with the bounded rationality assumption. Under this setting, we find two
important features. One, the optimal portfolio is affected by age. Second, the investment in risky
assets is much lower than those obtained by Merton (1971). Therefore, the investment in safe
assets is preferred according to this model than in previous analyses.
Throughout the paper we show that, when there is no Social Security or the payroll tax is
equal to zero, our individual invests her wealth both in equities and in annuities. On the contrary,
as the Social Security payroll tax increases, our agent is more willing to purchase bonds instead
of annuities. According to this fact, we find that an actuarially fair funded social security system
could increase the stock of capital in the long run if, and only if, our agent only purchases bonds at
the beginning of her life-cycle. We simulate that the wealth increment, with a 6 percent payroll tax
and private fair annuities, is close to 17 percent. However, under a private unfair annuity market
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this wealth increment is reduced, even to the point of decreasing wealth in the long run.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains the consumer’s behavior
when there is no Social Security. Here, we obtain the optimal portfolio choice with the intention of
subsequently estimating how wealth evolves over time. In section III, we introduce a funded social
security system. It will enable us to calculate how public and private wealth evolve according to
different payroll taxes. Section IV describes the effects of a funded social security system on the
demand for private annuities. Furthermore, we shall distinguish between actuarially fair annuities
and unfair annuities. In Section V we make our final conclusions. An Appendix containing a
detailed demonstration of optimal investment as well as consumption behavior finishes the paper.
2 Optimal Portfolio Choice under Uncertain Lifetime: Bonds, Equi-
ties, and Annuities
Individuals, who finance their future consumption using annuities, reduce the crowding out effect
that is caused by an actuarially fair funded social security system, Abel (1986). Unfortunately,
empirical research indicates that the value of the demand for annuities is small on average. There-
fore, to substitute an unfunded Social Security by a funded one does not necessarily eliminate the
crowding out effect.
A recent paper by Davidoff et al. (2005) suggests, among other reasons, that the lack of the
demand for annuities may be caused by behavioral biases. Building on this idea, Sanchez-Romero
(2005) proves that individuals with behavioral biases, such as bounded rationality, are more willing
to purchase annuities the greater wealth is in relation to future non-capital earnings. Hence, ceteris
paribus, we can expect that an actuarially fair funded Social Security causes a higher crowding
out in economies with low private wealth.
The aim of this section, therefore, is to derive how individuals who live in an economy without
Social Security accumulate assets to finance their future consumption at retirement. This result
will be used as a benchmark to compare to the asset accumulation process derived by introducing
a social security system. We develop an economy composed of financial companies which supply
safe and risky assets (e.g. bonds and equities) and private insurances that offer annuities. The
significance of the introduction of equities into the model is twofold. First, an economic model
which studies private pensions needs to take into account how bonds and equities evolve. Second,
if the agent has perfect foresight and short-selling is not constrained, then this model yields a
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greater accumulation of wealth which may lead to an increase in the demand for annuities. This
point will be analyzed at the end of this section.
The representative economic agent faces an uncertain lifetime. Her survival probability Ω is
known in advance, but the age that she will die is unknown. T is the maximum age to which the
agent can survive. In addition, our economic agent has three key features which affect her invest-
ment decision making. First, the consumer is selfish. She does not leave an intentional bequest at
death. Second, following Sanchez-Romero (2005), the agent does not take into account that finan-
cial institutions do not allow individuals to die in debt. So, we can say that our agent has a bounded
rationality. This assumption affects the demand for annuities. For example, in order to anticipate
consumption, individuals purchase annuities when they are young, and reject using annuities when
they are retired. Third, the individual temporarily modifies her consumption according to financial
markets expectations. Concretely, she increases her consumption while she expects to gain money
investing in financial markets. This last assumption makes the consumption decision stochastic.
Thus, instead of using an expected utility function, we use a mean-variance utility v(c, σ2c ), which
satisfies the conditions demonstrated in Tsiang (1972). Therefore, the consumer’s utility at age x
is depicted by the following function U :
U(x) =
∫ T
x
Ω(s)
Ω(x)
β(s− x)v (c(s, x), σ2c (s, x)) ds, for all x ∈ [0, T ). (1)
Where c(s, x) is the mean consumption at age s, of an x year old consumer, σ2c (s, x) is the con-
sumption variance at age s, of an x year old consumer. The function v is at least twice differ-
entiable, strictly increasing in c(s, x), and decreasing in σ2c (s, x).
Ω(s)
Ω(x) is the probability that an
individual of age x will be alive at age s, and β(s − x) is the time discount factor from age x to
age s, or e−δ(s−x),∀δ ≥ 0.
Given a mean consumption level, the utility function (1) shows that the higher the consumption
risk is, the lower the utility achieved by the consumer is. Hence, assuming that consumption
variance is caused by risky asset investments, the consumer will maximize her consumption by
investing in an efficient portfolio with the minimum variance and maximum expected return, as
Sharpe (1964) and Markowitz (1952) suggest.
There are two alternative portfolios. The first one is composed by bonds and equities. The
second one is composed by annuities and equities. Bonds and equities yield a safe interest rate r
and a random interest rate α, respectively. Annuities, on the contrary, are lotteries contingent on
the consumer mortality risk. Specifically, if the consumer survives at the end of the period, she
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will receive the safe interest rate r plus a risk premium µ contingent on her mortality risk. But, if
she does not survive at the end of the period, she will not receive anything.
Each period, our representative individual has an initial wealth k and a labor income y. The
individual takes y(s),∀s ∈ [0, T ) as given. These resources are allocated to both consumption and
investment. Nonetheless, she must choose the portfolio in which she will compound her resources.
Thus, the agent at age x faces two alternative budget constraints.
k(x) +
∫ T
x
R(s)
R(x)
((α(s)− r(s))e(s, x) + y(s)− c(s, x)) ds = 0, (2)
and
k(x) +
∫ T
x
R(s)
R(x)
Ω(s)
Ω(x)
((α(s)− r(s))e(s, x) + y(s)− c(s, x)) ds = 0. (3)
(2) and (3) are respectively the budget constraint when consumption is financed (besides by equi-
ties) by investing in conventional assets, and when consumption is financed by annuities. e(s, x)
is the amount of money invested in risky assets at age s, of an x year old consumer.2 R(s)R(x) is the
financial present value at age x, of a monetary unit received at age s, and R(s)R(x)
Ω(s)
Ω(x) is the actuarial
present value; that is,
R(s)
R(x)
= e−
∫ s
x r(j)dj ,
and
R(s)
R(x)
Ω(s)
Ω(x)
= e−
∫ s
x (r(j)+µ(j))dj .
It is worth noting that neither (2) nor (3) constrain wealth to be nonnegative along the lifespan.
Nevertheless, the economic agent never dies in debt under (3), but she could under (2). This is
an important property that we shall use subsequently. Also, if the consumer decides to purchase
annuities, she will not leave a bequest. But, in contrast, if she chooses to finance consumption by
investing in bonds, she will unintentionally bequeath at death. Therefore, choosing either (2) or
(3) has important consequences on income distribution inter and intra-generations. However, this
fact is beyond the scope of this paper.
So far we have established the general framework from which an individual accumulates assets
to finance her future consumption. Now, we shall proceed by explaining the solutions obtained by
plugging a CRRA utility function (u(ξ) = ξ1−γ1−γ , γ > 0) into (1), and assuming that consumption
variance at age s is proportional to risky investment variance at age s, of an x year old consumer.
2Hereinafter, whenever the consumer will decide to purchase annuities, both mean consumption and money invested
in risky assets will be denoted with a hat.
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That is,
σ2c (s, x) = η
2σ2α(s)e
2(s, x), for all s, x ∈ [0, T ) with s > x, (4)
where η > 0 is the constant of proportionality and σ2α is the equity variance.
The agent maximizes (1) subject to either (2) or (3). Solving this economic problem yields
two different consumption trajectories, which are quite similar to the uncertain lifetime case with
just bonds and annuities.3 Nevertheless, equities now modify the marginal utility of consumption
and, consequently, the dynamic of consumption is also moved according to the expected evolution
of asset returns. For example, consumption increases (resp. decreases) whenever the difference
between asset returns also increases (resp. decreases). These consumption changes, nonetheless,
are not high enough to produce consumption trajectories totally different from those obtained by
Sanchez-Romero (2005). This circumstance is explained by the small investment in risky assets,
depicted by any of the following equations:
e(x, x) =
1
γ
(
α(x)− r(x)
σ2α(x)
)
ψ(x, x)
η2
c(x, x),
or
eˆ(x, x) =
1
γ
(
α(x)− r(x)− µ(x)
σ2α(x)
)
ψˆ(x, x)
ηˆ2
cˆ(x, x).
Where both ψ and ψˆ are functions whose range are restricted to the closed interval [1, 2]. The first
two components on the right side of the equality signal are similar to Merton (1971) and Richard
(1975). However, the amount of money invested in risky assets depends on consumption, instead
of depending on initial wealth and the present value of future non-capital earnings. As a conse-
quence, this model yields portfolios which are mainly composed of either bonds or annuities.4 In
particular, the proportion of either bonds or annuities relative to equities raises as our individual
ages. Thus, equities are the main investment when the economic agent is young, but as time goes
by she prefers to hold safer investments.
On the other hand, so long as Social Security does not pay benefits, wealth is also held in
annuities rather than in bonds. Both the bounded rationality and the liquidity constraint assump-
3The reader will find the analytical solutions in the appendix.
4According to Tsiang (1972), the CRRA utility function u(y) is convergent to v(c, σ2c ) if, and only if:
η ≥
(
ε(1 + γ)
2
+
1
εγ
)
·max
∥∥∥∥α(x)− r(x)σα(x)
∥∥∥∥
∀x∈[0,T )
,
where ε is a real number which satisfies that σc
c
≤ ε < 1. In particular, Tsiang (1972) suggests a value of 1
10
for ,
therefore we cannot expect high values of ψ(x,x)
η2
. Note that this condition corresponds to the non-annuitized wealth
case. Thus, if we are interested in the value of ηˆ, we should add the mortality risk premium to r(x).
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tions are key factors for this allocation process. Thus, unless individuals purchase annuities or
they have sufficient capital, they are unable to anticipate consumption at the beginning of their life
cycle. Therefore, we find that young individuals are more willing to purchase annuities in order
to increase their consumption. However, the presence of annuities raises borrowed money and so,
because individuals must repay their debts, the economic agents have a lower positive asset posi-
tion upon retirement. This latter fact negatively affects the demand for annuities, Sanchez-Romero
(2005). Nonetheless, they will buy insurances contingent on their death due to the lack of public
benefits assumed so far.
In sum, in an economy without Social Security, we find that our agent allocates her wealth in
a portfolio composed by equities and annuities. But, equities represent a small percentage of total
wealth, and annuities decrease wealth held upon retirement among those individuals who have
needed to borrow money at young ages.
3 Payroll Tax and Wealth-Age Profiles
Up to now, we have studied the asset accumulation process of an individual who lives in an econ-
omy without Social Security. Under this scenario, we have found that individuals mainly purchase
annuities because it enables one to borrow money, and because it assures an income after retire-
ment. In this section however we introduce an actuarially fair funded social security system that
assures an income at retirement. Thus, Social Security levies a payroll tax τ on gross earnings, in
exchange of a future benefit when people retire. According to this fact, we rewrite income as the
following piecewise function:
y(s) =
 (1− τe)w(s) 0 ≤ s < Jb(s) s ≥ J , (5)
wherew(s) is the gross salary at age s, b(s) = b, for all s, is the flat public pension benefit received
at retirement, and J is the age of retirement. We consider that the payroll tax is paid not only by
the employee τe, but also by the employer τf . As a consequence, our representative individual
receives an actuarially fair pension benefit equal to:
b = (τe + τf )
∫ J
0 R(s)Ω(s)w(s)ds∫ T
J R(s)Ω(s)ds
. (6)
This assumption is introduced into the model because current social security regimes are
jointly financed by employers and employees. In addition, the fact that Social Security is financed
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by these two agents has important and interesting consequences on individual saving. For exam-
ple, a funded social security system financed by employers and employees generates an increase
in lifetime resources. The positive income effect caused by the system, however, differs accord-
ing to the portfolio chosen by each individual. Thus, in a model without firms, Hubbard (1987)
proves that an actuarially fair and funded system generates an increase in lifetime resources when
individuals do not purchase actuarially fair annuities. Nevertheless, a system partially financed
by employers generates an increase in lifetime resources as well, even when individuals purchase
annuities. That is to say, substituting equation (5) and (6) into the budget constraint (3), and af-
terwards subtracting (3) with respect to the budget constraint without Social Security, we have
that
τf
∫ J
0
R(s)Ω(s)w(s)ds. (7)
This increment in resources correspond to those individuals who purchase actuarially fair annu-
ities. (7) equals the pension financed by the employer; since we are assuming that w(s) is the
maximum gross salary, that the employer is willing to pay without Social Security. On the con-
trary, if our individual decides to finance her consumption with the portfolio composed by bonds,
we will expect a greater increment in lifetime resources than if it is financed by annuities.5 Re-
peating the previous process, but now with the budget constraint (2), we get that
κ
(
τf
∫ J
0
R(s)Ω(s)w(s)ds+ τe
∫ J
0
R(s)
(
Ω(s)− 1
κ
)
w(s)ds
)
, (8)
where κ is the difference in discount rates under certainty and uncertainty:
κ =
∫ T
J
R(s)ds
/∫ T
J
R(s)Ω(s)ds > 1.
We have found according to (7) and (8) that an actuarially fair funded Social Security could
raise lifetime resources. On the one hand, we know that the higher the income effect is, the greater
the payroll tax is. On the other hand, the income effect also increases when our individual decides
to invest in bonds, instead of doing so in annuities. Consequently, given a periodical earning such
as (5), we can enumerate three causes that reduce private saving: i) a decrease in net salary, ii)
an increase in consumption due to the positive income effect, and iii) a lower necessity of saving
for retirement motive. Nevertheless, the decrease in private savings is offset by an increase in
public savings. Therefore, it is not clear that the individual wealth6 will be reduced in the long
5Given that κ also depends on Ω, we expect that Ω(s) > 1
κ
for almost all ages (s) between x and J years old.
6Hereinafter we call “individual wealth” as the sum of private and public wealth.
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run. In fact, individual wealth may either increase or decrease depending on how the payroll tax
modifies both public and private wealth over time. In particular, we expect that Social Security
will raise (resp. reduce) individual wealth accumulated, so long as the elasticity of public savings
with respect to the payroll tax is greater (resp. lower) than the absolute value of the elasticity of
private savings with respect to the payroll tax.
In order to understand how individual wealth evolves over time, we simulate nine wealth
profiles which differ according to the payroll tax and the proportion of the tax levied by each
economic agent. To do so, we assume that bonds yield an annual constant interest rate r equal to
0.037. Equities yield an interest rate that follows an Ito process
α(s)ds = r(s)ds+ σαdB(s), dB(s) ∼ N(0,
√
ds)
where σα equals 0.1. The individual satisfies every feature explained in section 2, with a γ-value
of 2, and a time discount factor δ of 0.02. Moreover, we assume that the gross earning received by
the individual, which is used to calculate these wealth profiles, is depicted by Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: GROSS EARNING PROFILE (w(s))
The actuarially fair funded Social Security offers an implied rate of return equal to the mor-
tality hazard rate plus bonds return. Table 1 shows the annual pension benefits that our individual
will receive for different payroll taxes (i.e. τ = τe + τf ). On the one hand, it shows that a total
payroll tax of 3 percent roughly assure a benefit equal to the lowest income of her life. On the
other hand, values of 6 and 8 percent points approximately guarantee 85 percent of her average
earning and her highest earning, respectively. We have chosen these percentages because they are
the most important three cases, which will be explained subsequently. In addition, a percentage
greater than 8 percent makes no sense because it has perverse effects both on private saving and
on the economy.
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Table 1: BENEFITS (b)
Payroll Tax (τ ) Annual Pension Benefit
0,03 8.727,70
0,06 17.455,00
0,08 23.274,00
Note: The individual retires at the age of 65. The mor-
tality hazard rate is assumed to follow the Gompertz’s
Law µ(s) = αeβs, where α is equal to 9, 221765·10−5
and β = 0, 085277.
Given this setup, Figure 2 shows that our individual borrows money at the beginning of her
life-cycle in order to anticipate her consumption. However, the money borrowed decreases as the
payroll tax increases (dotted square line). Note in Figure 2 that changing the total payroll tax τ
from 3 to 6 raises individual wealth. By contrast, Figure 3 shows that a payroll tax of 8 percent
leads our individual to not save for retirement (dotted line with an x mark); as a consequence total
wealth is almost the same as an economy without Social Security (solid line).
Figure 2: WEALTH PROFILES: PAYROLL TAXES 3 AND 6 PERCENTS
We have found that the increment of total wealth occurs because young individuals are not
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Figure 3: WEALTH PROFILE: PAYROLL TAX 8 PERCENT
Note: In this case, there is no difference between the proportion
of the tax paid by each agent.
willing to purchase annuities. However, if our individual does not purchase annuities along her
lifespan, as happens in Figure 3, there will not be such an increment. Hence, there must exist a
payroll tax that maximizes individual wealth without strangling private savings. In this particular
case the optimal payroll tax is equal to 6, as Table 2 shows.
Table 2: INDIVIDUAL WEALTH AT THE AGE OF 65
τe (τf = 0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Percentage 100 100 100 100 100 105 117 89 102
Note: 100 = 247.519, 26 euros.
This fact implies that even though a social security system leads young individuals to be worse
off in terms of consumption, their wealth become greater as they age (if, and only if, the system
has not excessively levied gross earnings). Thus, the system does not necessarily offset one public
monetary unit by another private one. In fact, a different payroll tax can help to raise individual
wealth.7 Another alternative for raising individual wealth is to increase τf and decrease τe. How-
ever, we have not found significant changes to wealth, as Figure 2 shows, that could balance the
negative effect on unemployment caused by the increment on the labor cost versus the capital cost.
In sum, an actuarially fair funded Social Security expels the demand for private annuities, but
it may increase individual wealth as well. The former effect has been widely discussed since Feld-
7Note that Table 2 is calculated under the assumption that τf equals 0.
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stein (1974). By contrast, the latter effect results if, and only if, the following two circumstances
take place: i) individuals voluntarily decide not to purchase annuities and ii) financial markets do
not allow individuals to die in debt. Therefore, this result shows, contrary to previous research,
that a social security system can contribute to reaching a higher national wealth, even when the
economy is made up of selfish individuals.
4 Effects of a Fully Funded Social Security on the Demand for Pri-
vate Annuities
It has been pointed out that an actuarially fair and fully funded social security system does not
reduce the steady-state wealth whenever individuals are selfish and a private annuity market exists.
In order to obtain this result, it is necessary to assume that individuals are rational. Otherwise, if
individuals have a bounded rationality of the sort explained in this paper, the actuarially fair and
fully funded Social Security can either increase or decrease steady-state wealth (see Table 2). Since
the introduction of the system reduces the desire of purchasing annuities and, as a consequence,
individuals can either have a greater individual wealth because they do not borrow money at young
ages, or have a lower individual wealth because they do not save for retirement. Therefore, we
analyze in this section the possible reasons for not investing in private annuities and how it affects
individual wealth.
The introduction of this social security system yields two reasons for not investing in annu-
ities. First, it causes a lower private wealth upon retirement8 that reduces the desire of purchasing
annuities. As it is explained by Sanchez-Romero (2005). Second, following Hubbard (1987),
individuals may prefer bonds to annuities in order to achieve higher lifetime resources, see (8).
Thereby, the higher the contribution to Social Security is, the greater the crowding out effect on the
demand for private annuities is. However, the first reason is offset because we have assumed that
financial institutions do not allow individuals to die in debt. Thus, Social Security may increase
private wealth by inducing individuals to hold their wealth in the form of bonds; since once they
purchase bonds instead of annuities, they are unable to borrow money and so they have a greater
positive asset position earlier.9 The intensity of these two opposite effects on private wealth is the
key factor to determine whether or not the system produces a crowding out. In particular, we find
8This is equivalent to say that Social Security reduces private saving for retirement.
9In order to realize this fact, compare in Figure 2 those charts on the left side with those on the right side.
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that Social Security raises wealth while it does not cancel private saving for retirement.
This current section proceeds as follows. First, we explain the demand for private annuities
when there is no Social Security. We use its annuity equivalent wealth values (AEW) as our
baseline case. Subsequently, we divide this section in two subsections in order to give insight
into how Social Security changes the demand for private annuities. One subsection shows an
individual’s behavior when private markets offer fair annuities, and the other subsection shows
the individual’s behavior when they offer unfair annuities. Both subsections contain tables and
figures which depict the desire to purchase annuities for different payroll taxes and risk aversion
coefficients.
We found in section 3 that young people prefer annuities to bonds in order to anticipate con-
sumption. This is because financial institutions do not lend money unless people insure their
wealth with life insurances. Later on, assuming an economy without public pensions, individuals
prefer to purchase annuities in order to maintain their economic status. If they choose, by contrast,
the alternative portfolio composed of bonds, then they have the risk of outliving their financial
resources more quickly. Equivalently, in the case of holding their wealth in bonds, individuals
may not have an income in the time just before death. Therefore, people always prefer to purchase
annuities when there is no Social Security. Figure 4 below shows this statement for the represen-
tative agent introduced in the previous section. Note that AEW values10 are higher than one, and
thus annuities are preferred over bonds. AEW has a Λ-shape which means that this individual is
more willing to purchase annuities as she approaches the date of retirement; while she is almost
indifferent when choosing between bonds and annuities both at the beginning of her life-cycle and
at the end.
The introduction of Social Security will move the AEW figure downwards. Thus, given that
AEW has a Λ-shape, we have to expect that the system mainly affects our individual when young,
conditioning her future decisions afterwards. In addition to age, Figure 4 also changes according
to the behavior towards risk and the proportion of the load charged upon annuities.
4.1 Perfect Life Insurance
Private annuity markets, which offer actuarially fair life insurances, assure that individuals’ life-
time resources raise according to either (7) or (8). Consequently, every result already obtained is
10The proportion of annuitized wealth that is necessary to achieve the utility level when the consumer has no access
to the annuity market.
13
Figure 4: A.E.W. BY AGE WITHOUT SOCIAL SECURITY
Note: An annuity equivalent wealth value lower (resp. greater)
than one means that the individual prefers (resp. does not prefer)
bonds to annuities.
applicable. Here, we focus on studying how private wealth is modified by different payroll taxes
and risk aversion coefficients. This is because, following Sanchez-Romero (2005), the demand for
private annuities mainly depends on private wealth and on future benefits. In order to analyze this
fact, we will first pay attention to our agent at the age of 65, see Table 3 below. Second, we shall
study with the help of Figure 5 the demand for private annuities in a dynamic perspective.
Table 3: PRIVATE WEALTH AT THE AGE OF 65
Payroll Tax Risk Aversion Coefficient
τe vs. τf γ = 0.75 γ = 2 γ = 5
3-0 292.550,10a 153.032,06a 114.137,23a
1,5-1,5 298.355,56a 156.744,85a 117.266,63a
0,5-2,5 302.225,87a 159.220,04a 119.352,89a
6-0 213.502,81a 100.001,84a 55.353,57a
3-3 222.280,32a 103.725,10a 58.056,57a
1-5 227.218,18a 106.177,29a 59.878,10a
8-0 0,00b 0,00b 0,00b
4-4 0,00b 0,00b 45.476,75a
1,33-6,67 0,00b 0,00b 49.068,69a
a The individual decides to annuitize her private wealth.
b The individual prefers to hold her private wealth in bonds.
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Table 3 above shows whether our individual purchases annuities (superscript a) or not (superscript
b) according to her private wealth and her risk aversion coefficient. Thus, the table contains three
important features: i) given the gross earning profile of Figure 1 and using Table 1, we find that
our individual purchases annuities so long as the payroll tax is lower than 8 percent. This is an
important result not only because she achieves, according to Table 2, a greater wealth, but also
because it assures a periodical income up to her death. ii) it is worth noting that in this model the
risk aversion coefficient causes two opposite effects upon the demand for private annuities. On
the one hand, it is well known that the higher the risk aversion coefficient is, the greater the desire
of an agent to purchase annuities is. However, on the other hand, we see in Table 3 that the lower
the γ value is, the greater the private wealth at the age of retirement is. Thus, the agent is more
willing to purchase annuities. In sum, once again the risk aversion coefficient does not explain
the demand for annuities. Finally, iii) private wealth increases as the proportion of the payroll tax
paid by the employer increases. This wealth increment nonetheless is not high enough to balance
the resources paid by the employer11 except for the case in which both the individual is quite risk
adverse and the payroll tax is greater or equal than 8 percent.
Figure 5: A.E.W. BY AGE WITH SOCIAL SECURITY AND FAIR ANNUITIES
In addition to the static analysis presented in Table 3, Figure 5 above shows the AEW values
by age associated with the following payroll taxes: (3-0), (6-0) and (8-0). The solid line plots how
our individual always prefers annuities to bonds with a payroll tax of 3 percent. A payroll tax
of 6 percent (dotted line) causes our individual to decide to purchase bonds instead of annuities
at the beginning of her life-cycle. The dashed line plots how she always purchases bonds with a
payroll tax of 8 percent. Therefore, AEW values by age are pushed downwards as the payroll tax
increases (in order to see how AEW by age evolves, compare Figure 5 with Figure 4). However,
11According to equation (6) the amount of the benefit received only depends on the total payroll tax, i.e. τe + τf .
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once the individual has decided to purchase bonds along the rest of her life, the AEW by age has
an inverted Λ-shape. As a consequence, we do not expect that she will reject her investment once
she has decided the asset in which she allocates her wealth. In fact, as seen in Figure 5, financial
institutions will have to offer greater returns in order to be able to make people change from one
asset to another.12
4.2 Imperfect Life Insurance
In the real world we do not find actuarially fair annuities. In general, annuities are loaded by
insurers with the intention of financing reserves, administrative costs, commissions, and profits.
Therefore, it is more realistic to analyze previous results when life insurances do not offer fair
annuities. The first consequence of this fact is that an actuarially fair funded Social Security
offers a higher rate of return than private annuities, and hence individuals achieve a greater wealth
by investing in public pensions than in private annuities. Second, an imperfect annuity market
cannot offset those annuities offered by the social security system. This situation causes both an
income effect and a substitution effect that change the demand for private annuities when fair life
insurances were offered. Specifically, a lower annuity return increases present consumption and
diminishes future consumption due to the substitution effect. Thus, our individual either consumes
all her income if she invests in bonds, or borrows more money at the beginning of her life-cycle,
and subsequently increases her saving, in the case of investing in annuities. On the other hand,
given that public benefits are actuarially fair, an imperfect private annuity market reduces the
income effect produced by investing in bonds. In order to show this fact, we assume for the sake
of simplicity that annuities yield the following rate of return at age s:13
r(s) + (1−$)µ(s), for all s ∈ [x, T ),
where $ ∈ (0, 1) is the percentage of load over the mortality hazard rate. Note that we use this
formula in order to satisfy that the yield of annuities still dominates that of bonds. Thereby, (7)
12Thus, if policy makers aim to annuitize private pension plans, then it is convenient to undertake policies when
people are between 30 and 50 years old.
13Now, Ω has been transformed to Ωˆ which has the following formula:
Ωˆ(x) = e−(1−$)
∫ x
0 µ(j)dj > Ω(x), for all x ∈ [0, T ).
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converges to (8) as we give to $ a value close to 1. Thus (7) is now rewritten as
κˆ
(
τf
∫ J
0
R(s)Ω(s)w(s)ds+ τe
∫ J
0
R(s)
(
Ω(s)− Ωˆ(s)
κˆ
)
w(s)ds
)
, (9)
where κˆ is the difference in discount rates under unfair annuities and fair ones:
κˆ =
∫ T
J
R(s)Ωˆ(s)ds
/∫ T
J
R(s)Ω(s)ds > 1.
From (9) we derive, whenever insurers offer unfair annuities, that the positive income effect caused
by switching from annuities to bonds is diminished. According to this effect, annuities are now
more preferred than bonds. However, the latter cannot balance the substitution effect. Indeed, we
can see comparing Tables 3 and 4 below, that bonds are now more preferred than annuities at the
age of 65.
Table 4: PRIVATE WEALTH UNDER UNFAIR ANNUITIES AT THE
AGE OF 65
Payroll Tax Load Risk Aversion Coefficient
τe $ γ = 0.75 γ = 2 γ = 5
0,25 245.527,90a 148.750,39a 119.05753a
3 0,50 199.331,52a 142.438,29a 124.514,48a
0,75 141.062,91b 131.942,28a 130.045,47a
0,25 0,00b 100.890,77a 57.383,95a
6 0,50 0,00b 33.473,84b 60.787,67a
0,75 0,00b 33.473,84b 66.450,95a
0,25 0,00b 0,00b 0,00b
8 0,50 0,00b 0,00b 0,00b
0,75 0,00b 0,00b 0,00b
a The individual decides to annuitize her private wealth.
b The individual prefers to hold her private wealth in bonds.
We realize in Table 4 that private wealth decreases more markedly as the risk aversion lowers
(see columns with γ = 2 and γ = 0, 75) and the load increases. Instead, a γ value equal to 5
yields a higher private wealth under unfair annuities than under fair ones. This is so because she
17
prefers bonds to annuities at the beginning of her life-cycle and, as a consequence, she cannot
borrow money because she simply consumes her income during this period. Moreover, we have
used three different loads {0,25; 0,5; 0,75} with the aim of showing how the demand for private
annuities mainly depends on the relationship between private wealth and the present value of
future earnings. Thus, it is worth noting that any of these loads yield, by definition, an annuity
internal rate of return greater than that of bonds (r = 0, 037); in particular, at the age of 65 they
are equal to {0,049; 0,046; 0,042} respectively. Therefore, the more unfair annuities are, the
greater the present value of future benefits with respect to current private wealth is. Thus, the
individual is less willing to purchase annuities.14 In addition to the relationship between private
wealth and future earnings, the risk aversion coefficient γ has to be considered as well, given that it
determines the threshold private wealth from which our individual switches her investments from
annuities to bonds. For example, Table 4 shows that, when annuities are not fair, an individual
with both a γ equal to 0, 75 and an annual pension benefit of 17.455 euros15 decides not to invest
either in bonds, nor in annuities, for retirement. By contrast, in the subsection 4.1, Table 3 shows
that under the same features our individual accumulates 213.502, 81 euros by investing in fair
annuities. Thus, we can note that the threshold private wealth is easily reached, so long as the risk
aversion decreases and the load increases.
Table 5: INDIVIDUAL WEALTH AT THE AGE OF 65 UNDER UNFAIR
ANNUITIES (γ = 2)
τe (τf = 0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
$ = 0, 25 102 101 99 98 97 106 117 89 102
$ = 0, 50 104 101 99 96 95 107 90 89 102
$ = 0, 75 107 102 97 91 97 94 90 89 102
We have used as benchmark 100 = 247.519, 26 euros, which corresponds to the
individual wealth achieved under fair annuities and no Social Security (see Table 2).
Note that individual wealth is greater than our benchmark case for payroll taxes 1,
5 and 6. Nonetheless, the difference is reduced, and is even negative, as the load
approaches to one.
14Read proposition 1 in Sanchez-Romero (2005).
15See Table 1.
18
In sum, assuming an actuarially fair funded Social Security, individual wealth at the age of
retirement is negatively affected by an unfair annuity market. This is so, unless policy makers
decide to either reduce the payroll tax below 3 percent, or increase it up to 8 percent (see Table 5).
However, if we take the first decision, we expect that people will outlive their financial resources
faster and, consequently, their consumption will decrease as time goes by. Therefore, looking at
consumption trajectories depicted in Figure 6 below, we recommend levying a payroll tax of 8
percent, not only because it assures an income after retirement, but also because individual wealth
is not depleted before death.
Figure 6: CONSUMPTION, INDIVIDUAL WEALTH AND A.E.W. BY AGE, WITH SOCIAL SECU-
RITY AND UNFAIR PRIVATE ANNUITIES ($=0,50; γ = 2)
Note: annuities are only purchased when the payroll tax
is lower than 3 percent.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents new results about the crowding out effect produced by an actuarially fair
funded Social Security on the stock of capital. We find that our consumer is more willing to
purchase bonds, instead of annuities, as the payroll tax levied increases. On the one side, Social
Security diminishes private wealth upon retirement which reduces the desire of purchasing annu-
ities. On the other side, our individual may prefer bonds to annuities in order to achieve higher
lifetime resources. We also find that, although this social security system expels the demand for
private annuities, it may increase individual wealth. This latter fact nonetheless only happens
so long as our individual voluntarily decides not to purchase annuities at the beginning of her
life-cycle and, furthermore, that financial markets do not allow individuals to die in debt.
These findings show, contrary to previous research, that a social security system can contribute
to reach a higher national wealth, even when the economy is composed by selfish individuals.
For example, some simulation exercises presented here point out that a payroll tax of 6 percent
increases individual wealth up to 17 percent points. This increment however is obtained under the
assumption that private insurers offer fair annuities. Thus, on the contrary, under an unfair private
annuity market, individual wealth can decrease around a 10 percent for the same payroll tax.
The importance of these findings raise some questions for future research. The most impor-
tant is to determine the optimal payroll tax under an unfunded Social Security. Since, given the
increasingly concern in developed countries about the feasibility of the social security system, a
similar finding, as the one presented here, could contribute not only to decrease the payroll tax
for future generations of workers, but also to give new reasons for maintaining the current social
security system.
References
Andrew B. Abel. “Precautionary Saving and Accidental Bequests”. The American Economic
Review, 75(4):777–791, September 1985.
Andrew B. Abel. “Capital Accumulation and Uncertain Lifetimes with Adverse Selection”.
Econometrica, 54(5):1079–1098, September 1986.
Alan J. Auerbach and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge University Press,
1987.
20
J. C. Conesa and D. Krueger. “Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents”. Review of
Economic Dynamics, 2:757–795, 1999.
Thomas Davidoff, Jeffrey Brown, and Peter Diamond. “Annuities and Individual Welfare”. The
American Economic Review, forthcoming, December 2005.
Zvi Eckstein, Martin S. Eichenbaum, and Dan Peled. “The Distribution of Wealth and Welfare in
the Presence of Incomplete Annuity Markets”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(3):
789–806, August 1985.
Martin Feldstein. “Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation”.
Journal of Political Economy, 82(5):905–926, 1974.
Luisa Fuster. “Is Altruism Important for Understanding the Long-Run Effects of Social Security?”.
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2:616–637, 1999.
R. Glenn Hubbard. Issues in Pension Economics, chapter Uncertain Lifetime, Pensions, and Indi-
vidual Saving, pages 175–206. NBER, 1987.
A. ˙Imrohorog˘lu, S. ˙Imrohorog˘lu, and D. Joines. “Social Security in an Overlapping Generations
Economy with Land”. Review of Economic Dynamics, 2:638–665, 1999.
Harry Markowitz. “Portfolio Selection”. The Journal of Finance, 7(1):77–91, March 1952.
Robert C. Merton. “Optimum Consumption and Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model”.
Journal of Economic Theory, 3:373–413, December 1971.
Scott F. Richard. “Optimal Consumption, Porfolio and Life Insurance Rules for an Uncertain
Lived Individual in a Continuous Time Model”. Journal of Financial Economics, 2:187–203,
1975.
Miguel Sanchez-Romero. “Welfare Gain and the Demand for Annuities”. Economic Analysis
Working Paper Series 2/2005, November 2005.
William F. Sharpe. “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of
Risk”. The Journal of Finance, 19(3):425–442, September 1964.
S. C. Tsiang. “The Rationale of the Mean-Standard Deviation Analysis, Skewness Preference, and
the Demand for Money”. The American Economic Review, 62(3):354–371, June 1972.
21
Menahem Yaari. “Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer”. The
Review of the Economic Studies, 5(3):304–317, September 1965.
22
Appendix
Our agent decides each time whether to annuitize her wealth or not. This circumstance lies
on the assumption (v) (bounded rationality) introduced in this model. As a consequence, our
individual compares the utility reported by annuitizing her wealth with not doing so. Thus, we
maximize her expected utility twice regarding either equation (2) or equation (3). But, because the
algebra in both processes are similar, we shall only derive the optimal consumption and investment
at age x, when our individual decides not to annuitize her wealth.
Optimal Consumption and Investment at age x under Annuitized Wealth.
Assuming that our agent at age x maximizes equation (1), subject to (2) and (4) then, we can
compute the optimal allocation process as an isoperimetric problem, whose equation is
= ≡ =(c, e, λ(x)) = ∫ Tx Ω(s)Ω(x)β(s− x)( c(s,x)1−γ1−γ − γ2 σ2α(s)η2e2(s,x)c(s,x)1+γ ) ds
+λ(x)
(
k(x) +
∫ T
x
R(s)
R(x) (θ(s)σα(s)e(s, x) + y(s)− c(s, x)) ds
)
where θ(s) = α(s)−r(s)σα(s) .
The first-order conditions at age x for c, e and λ(x), respectively, are
c(x, x)−γ +
γ(1 + γ)
2
σ2α(x)η
2e2(x, x)c(x, x)−2−γ − λ(x) = 0, (10)
−γσ2α(x)η2e(x, x)c(x, x)−1−γ + λ(x)θ(x)σα(x) = 0, (11)
k(x) +
∫ T
x
R(s)
R(x)
(θ(s)σα(s)e(s, x) + y(s)− c(s, x)) ds = 0. (12)
Now, we should follow the next six steps in order to derive c(x, x) and e(x, x). Firstly, we derive
the function e(x, x) from (11). Second, we plug e(x, x) into (10) and multiply both sides of the
equation by c(x, x)γ . Third, let define the function
ϕ(s, x) =
λ(x)
β(s− x)
R(s)
R(x)
Ω(x)
Ω(s)
c(s, x)γ ,∀s ∈ [x, T ) (13)
and introduce it into the last equation. Thus, by solving the second-order equation in the variable
ϕ(s, x), it is easy to prove that = is maximized if, and only if:
ϕ(s, x) =
1−
√
1− 21+γγ
(
θ(s)
η
)2
1+γ
γ
(
θ(s)
η
)2 for all x ∈ [0, T ).
Fourth, using (13) and ϕ(s, x), we obtain that c(s, x) and e(s, x) are
c(s, x) =
(
1
λ(x)
) 1
γ
ψx(s), (14)
e(s, x) =
1
γ
(
α(s)− r(s)
σ2α(s)
)
ϕ(s, x)c(s, x)
η2
, (15)
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where ψx(s) = ϕˆ
1
γ (s)
(
Ω(s)
Ω(x)
R(x)
R(s)β(s− x)
) 1
γ for all s ∈ [x, T ). Fifth, by plugging equations (14)
and (15) into (12), the lagrangian multiplier satisfies:
(
1
λ(x)
) 1
γ
=
k(x) +
∫ T
x
R(s)
R(x)y(s)ds∫ T
x
R(s)
R(x)ψx(s)
(
1− 1γϕ(s, x) θ
2(s)
η2
)
ds
. (16)
Sixth and last, we introduce (16) into (14). So, the rate of expenditure on consumption and the
amount of money invested in risky assets at age x are equal to
c(x, x) = ψx(x)
k(x) +
∫ T
x
R(s)
R(x)y(s)ds∫ T
x
R(s)
R(x)ψx(s)
(
1− 1γϕ(s, x) θ
2(s)
η2
)
ds
, (17)
and
e(x, x) =
1
γ
(
α(x)− r(x)
σ2α(x)
)
ϕ(x, x)c(x, x)
η2
. (18)
Nonetheless, we still need to prove that (17) and (18) are maximums as well as (1) converges
to a mean-variance utility function. Thus, = satisfies the set of sufficient conditions for a regular
interior maximum, ∣∣∣∣∣∣ =cc =ce=ec =ee
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0,
where if e(s, x) > 0 (resp. < 0) then =ce = =ec > 0 (resp. < 0). And finally, following Tsiang
(1972), we apply the following two constraints in order that a CRRA utility function converges to
our mean-variance utility function:
1. σc(s,x)c(s,x) < ε,∀s ∈ [x, T ), where ε is an infinitesimal.
2. 1− 21+γγ
(
θ(s)
η
)2 ≥ 0,∀s ∈ [x, T ).
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